Learning Lessons from a National Covid Response

The report from Module 1 of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry is heartening reading

A quick departure from things ‘net zero’.

When I first heard that the UK Covid-19 Inquiry had been set in motion, I inwardly groaned. ‘Another jamboree for [possibly]-overpaid lawyers’, I thought.

My dread increased as hearings were reported to have featured the main characters from HMGov and advisers who were ‘responsible’ for UK lockdown, each seemingly taking their turn on the witness stand to glorify their own wisdom and heroic decision-making. The media seemed to be drawing the conclusion that, next pandemic, HMGov policy would be changed to ensure lockdowns would be earlier and harder. (As indeed most media had called for while the Covid-19 pandemic was raging.)

On top of all this, the whole enquiry gravy-train was due to keep rolling for years…
Fat chance of anyone remembering what happened, never mind being able to learn lessons, I thought, rather glumly.

Now - already - the report from Module 1 has been published (18 July 2024).

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry is the Rt Hon the Baroness Hallett DBE. She has an impressive CV, as you can see from that linked Wiki profile, including chairing the inquest into the Islamist atrocities in London in 2005 (the “7/7 bombings”). She also appears to have cut through the self-serving narratives to focus on the evidence, and has drawn her conclusions accordingly.

In the introduction she states: “few countries have established formal legal inquiries investigating the many aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic, let alone inquiries of this scale. A number of countries, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Australia, have instead instituted independent commissions led by experts in epidemiology, public health, economics and public policy. Such research commissions may be quicker and cheaper than a UK statutory inquiry, but they are not necessarily legal processes with the force of the law behind them. Most do not have the powers to compel the production of evidence or the giving of sworn testimony by political and administrative leaders; they are not open to public scrutiny in the same way as this Inquiry”…

So to my readers in those and other territories I suggest that there are valuable lessons to be learned here. The Executive Summary spans just 3½ pages and a little under 1,400 words. It’s well worth reading at least that much.

I particularly welcome these statements:

“The Inquiry found that the system of building preparedness for the pandemic suffered from several significant flaws:
…
• The provision of advice itself could be improved. Advisers and advisory groups did not have sufficient freedom and autonomy to express dissenting views and suffered from a lack of significant external oversight and challenge. The advice was often undermined by ‘groupthink’. ”

and from the Recommendations:

“9. External ‘red teams’ should be regularly used in the Civil Service of the UK government and devolved administrations to scrutinise and challenge the principles, evidence, policies and advice relating to preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies.”

This piece from Toby Green in Unherd seems to come to similar conclusions:
“Did the Covid inquiry just admit lockdown was a mistake?”

By the way, I’ve long thought #Groupthink also infects ‘net zero’ planning, anywhere and everywhere. And with anything as consequential as ‘net zero’, I think the use of ‘red teams’ to challenge a cosy consensus is simply (un)common sense.

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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed are solely my own.

This material is not peer-reviewed.

I am against #GroupThink.

Your feedback via polite factual comments / reasoned arguments welcome.

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